Pears v. State: An Improper Application of Alaska’s Current Law to Intoxicated Drivers by Fishel, Alan
PEARS V STATE AN IMPROPER
APPLICATION OF ALASKA'S CURRENT LAW
TO INTOXICATED DRIVERS
I. INTRODUCTION
On the night of October 5, 1981, nineteen-year old Richard Pears,
while under the influence of alcohol, drove his truck through a red
light, striking an automobile, killing two people, and injuring a third.
A jury convicted Pears of second degree murder, the trial judge sen-
tenced him to twenty years in prison, and Alaska's Third Circuit
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the verdict.1 The Alaska
Supreme Court, reviewing only the length of Pears's sentence, found
the twenty-year sentence excessive and remanded for resentencing. 2
After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Pears to twenty years in
prison with ten years suspended. 3 As the first Alaska appellate court
decision involving a murder conviction for an intoxicated driver,4
Pears v. State represents a significant development in Alaska criminal
law.
In 1978, the Alaska legislature revised the state's Criminal Code.
The new Code took effect on January 1, 1980. Under the new Crimi-
nal Code a court theoretically could return a murder conviction
against an intoxicated driver under one of three provisions: 5 (1) first
degree murder, if the defendant intentionally causes death;6 (2) second
degree murder, if the defendant causes death "knowing that [his] con-
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1. Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903, 905 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
2. Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985). The supreme court's opinion
dealt only with the sentencing issue and did not address the propriety of applying
Alaska's second degree murder statute to Pears. Accordingly, this note will analyze
the rationale of the court of appeals' Pears decision.
3. Pears v. State, No. 4FA-S81-2429 (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 1985).
4. Id. at 911.
5. There are actually five murder provisions in the new Alaska Criminal Code.
Two of these provisions, however, cannot apply to an intoxicated driver. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.41. 100(a)(2) - 11.41.1 10(a)(3) (1983) (these provisions concern inducing
suicide, and causing death during the commission of one of six felonies, none of which
involve intoxicated driving).
6. Id. § 11.41.100. The Alaska Criminal Code defines the term "intentionally"
in the following manner:
A person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result described by a provi-
sion of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to
cause that result; . . ..
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duct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury"
(the "Knowledge Provision");7 or (3) second degree murder if the de-
fendant "intentionally performs an act that results in the death of an-
other person under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference
to the value of human life" (the "Extreme Indifference Provision").8
Pears was not charged with either first degree murder or second de-
gree murder under the Knowledge Provision; rather, he was both
charged with and convicted of second degree murder under the Ex-
treme Indifference Provision. 9
This note examines the question of whether the Extreme Indiffer-
ence Provision of the current Alaska Criminal Code permits an Alaska
court to return a murder conviction against an intoxicated driver such
as Pears, who has neither the intention to kill,10 nor the knowledge1
Id. § 11.81.900(a)(1). Therefore, under Alaska law, an intoxicated driver intention-
ally kills his victim if it was his conscious objective to kill that individual.
The Model Penal Code (MPC) of the American Law Institute was completed in
1962. It has played an important role in the widespread revision of the substantive
criminal law of the United States that has taken place in the last twenty years. The
MPC provides the foundation upon which the Alaska Criminal Code rests, see Neitzel
v. State, 655 P.2d, 325, 327 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), and therefore its provisions are
helpful in interpreting Alaska's criminal law.
The MPC does not define "intent," but it does provide that a person acts "pur-
posely" if it is his conscious objective to cause a particular result. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(a)(i) (Official Draft 1962). Thus, the MPC supports the conclusion that
the Alaska legislature believed that an intoxicated driver intentionally or purposely
killed only if it was his conscious objective to kill.
7. ALASKA STAT. § l1.41.110(a)(1) (1983). The Alaska Criminal Code defines
the term "knowledge" in the following manner:
A person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance
described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person is aware
that the conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists .... A
person who is unaware of conduct or a circumstance of which the person
would have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts knowingly
with respect to that conduct or circumstance ....
Id. § 11.81.900(a)(2). An intoxicated driver in Alaska, therefore, has knowledge that
his conduct is substantially certain to cause another person's death or serious physical
injury only if he is aware of the substantial certainty of that result or would have been
aware but for his intoxicated condition. Thus, an intoxicated driver who has neither
the intent nor the desire to kill may still be convicted under the Knowledge Provision
if a court finds that he "knew" that his actions would, with substantial certainty, cause
another person's death or serious physical injury.
8. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(2) (1983).
9. Pears, 672 P.2d at 903.
10. Clearly, someone such as Pears, who ran red lights while driving under the
influence of alcohol, cannot be held to have had the "conscious objective" to kill, see
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(1) (1983), and therefore cannot be convicted of first
degree murder in Alaska.
11. This note contends that a defendant like Pears, who ran several red lights
before his fatal accident, did not have subjective or objective knowledge that his ac-
tions would be substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to an-
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that his actions are substantially certain to cause another person's
death or serious physical injury. [For purposes of this note, drivers
other person, and therefore cannot be convicted under the Knowledge Provision. It is
intuitively clear that an intoxicated person, merely by driving a car, is not substan-
tially certain to cause death or serious physical injury. The additional facts that the
driver speeds, or runs several red lights cannot make the defendant substantially cer-
tain to cause death or serious physical injury to another.
The Alaska legislature does not define the phrase "substantially certain;" the dic-
tionary, however, defines "substantially" as for "all intents and purposes," see 9 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 56 (1933), and "certain" as "inevitable," see 2 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 234 (1933). When an intoxicated driver speeds
through several red lights, it is not for "all intents and purposes inevitable" that he
will kill or severely injure another. Expressing this concept in probabilistic terms sup-
ports this contention. Most would agree that the phrase "substantially certain" or the
phrase for "all intents and purposes inevitable" requires that there be at least an 80%
chance that the result will occur; and almost certainly four out of every five drunk
drivers who drive on a given night, even if the group includes only drunk drivers who
speed through red lights, do not kill or cause serious physical injury on that night.
Two relevant statistics prove the above contention. Nationally, 2.57 deaths oc-
curred per 100,000,000 miles of driving in 1983. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY 1983: NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY #2, at 3 (1983).
Assuming that the average length of a trip is ten miles, 2.57 deaths occurred per
10,000,000 motor vehicle trips. Assuming further that none of the victims were them-
selves intoxicated drivers and that every death occurred in a different accident -
obviously invalid assumptions favoring those who believe that Intoxicated Motorists
are substantially certain to cause another's death or serious physical injury - there
would be 2.57 fatal accidents per 10,000,000 motor vehicle trips. A study conducted
in the 1970's demonstrates that an intoxicated driver with a blood alcohol level of.15
is twenty-five times more likely to get into a fatal accident than is a sober driver, and
that an intoxicated driver with a .20 blood alcohol level is approximately one hundred
times more likely to get into a fatal accident than is the sober driver. U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., RURAL COURTS AND HIGHWAY SAFETY 39 (1977). Even assuming that all
intoxicated drivers have the higher .20 blood alcohol level, intoxicated drivers would
cause deaths in only 257 (2.57 x 100) trips out of every 10,000,000 trips they made:
they would present only a .00257% risk of causing death each time they drove. There
are no figures on how many people are "seriously injured" in motor vehicle accidents
involving a drunk driver. But even assuming that there are twice as many people who
are seriously injured as there are people who actually die from accidents with drunk
drivers, there would be only a .0075% (.0025% + [2 X .0025]) chance that an intox-
icated driver would cause a death or serious physical injury. Even if intoxicated driv-
ers who go through red lights are more likely to cause death or serious physical injury
than the totality of intoxicated drivers, they would have to be more than 10,000 times
as likely to kill or cause serious physical injury to approach the 80% certainty figure
which probably is required by the Knowledge Provision. The 10,000 times figure is
derived from .0075% x 10,000 which equals 75%.
The only example the Alaska legislature gives of an act that is "substantially
certain to kill" is that of an individual who shoots into a crowded room without the
specific intent to cause death or serious physical injury. 2 SENATE J. SUPp. No. 47, at
10 (June 12, 1978). An individual shooting into a crowded room produces a much
greater likelihood of death or serious physical injury than an Intoxicated Motorist
creates by driving through a red light unaware of whether someone is in the intersec-
tion. More plausible examples of intoxicated drivers that are substantially certain to
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who lack such intent or knowledge will be referred to as "Intoxicated
Motorist(s)."] This note focuses, therefore, on such intoxicated driv-
ers to whom the first degree murder statute12 and the Knowledge Pro-
vision of the second degree murder statute13 are inapplicable, and
attempts to shed light on whether the Alaska legislature intended to
permit the murder conviction of such defendants under the Extreme
Indifference Provision of the second degree murder statute.
At first glance the Extreme Indifference Provision seems applica-
ble to Intoxicated Motorists, such as Pears, who voluntarily drink
before driving. A closer examination, however, reveals that the Ex-
treme Indifference Provision should not be applied to Intoxicated Mo-
torists. The Pears result is indefensible in light of the legislative
history of the state's new Criminal Code, the language of several other
Alaska statutes, prior Alaska holdings, and the position the majority
of states take on the issue of Intoxicated Motorists, which provide in-
kill may be drivers who drive on the wrong side of the highway at rush hour, or who
see, or would have seen but for their intoxication, their eventual victim in time to stop.
12. This note does not discuss the issue of whether Alaska courts may convict an
intoxicated driver of murder where the defendant intentionally killed his victim. Cer-
tainly, the courts could convict an individual in such a circumstance. Alaska's first
degree murder statute covers any person who "with intent to cause the death of an-
other person. . . causes the death of any person." ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 (1983).
The likelihood of an intoxicated driver being found guilty of first degree murder never-
theless is remote. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (1983) provides in part: "[E]vidence
that the defendant was intoxicated may be offered whenever it is relevant to negate an
element of the offense that requires that the defendant intentionally cause a result."
One could imagine, however, a case where an intoxicated driver did intentionally kill
his victim, such as where the defendant, who planned to kill his victim before becom-
ing intoxicated, ultimately ran him over with his car after becoming intoxicated.
13. This note also does not focus on the question of whether Alaska courts may
return a murder conviction for an intoxicated driver who had knowledge that his
actions were substantially certain to cause serious injury or kill another individual.
Once again, the Criminal Code clearly provides the answer, and once again the answer
is in the affirmative. The Knowledge Provision of § 11.41.1 10(a)(1) provides: "[A]
person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if. . . knowing that the
conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to another
person, the person causes the death of any person."
In addition, an Alaska court should, under the Knowledge Provision, return a
murder conviction despite the intoxicated driver's lack of actual knowledge that his
actions were substantially certain to cause another's death or serious physical injury if
it was the driver's intoxicated condition that caused his lack of knowledge. See
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(2); see also supra note 7. A court should reach this
result if a hypothetical sober passenger of the driver - an objective observer - would
have been aware that the defendant's actions would, with substantial certainty, cause
serious physical injury or death to another person. An intoxicated driver who speeds
down the wrong side of the highway at rush hour, for example, should be convicted of
murder even if he subjectively is unaware that his actions were substantially certain to
cause death or serious physical injury - as long as it was the motorist's intoxicated
condition that caused his unawareness of the substantial certainty of the result.
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sight into the meaning of the Alaska's legislature's failure to explicitly
resolve the issue.
Part II of this note first examines Alaska's common law treat-
ment of intoxicated drivers who cause fatal accidents, and then exam-
ines Alaska's current homicide statutes, focusing on the relevant
legislative history of these statutes. Part III compares Alaska's ap-
proach to deaths caused by intoxicated drivers with the statutes and
case law of other states. Part IV analyzes the Pears decision, conclud-
ing that it is not supported by either the legislative history of the rele-
vant Alaska statutes, prior holdings of Alaska courts, or case law in
the majority of the other states. Part V suggests how the legislature
might deal with the problem of "drunk driving" without resorting to
murder convictions for such defendants, while at the same time in-
forming the courts and the public exactly what punishment is intended
for intoxicated drivers who cause deaths. This note proposes that the
legislature clarify the punishment by enacting special vehicle homicide
legislation dealing specifically with the problem of motor vehicle
deaths and intoxicated drivers. This legislative reform would be par-
ticularly appropriate in light of the current confused state of Alaska
law regarding intoxicated drivers. 14
II. PRE-1980 ALASKA CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RELEVANT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NEW ALASKA
CRIMINAL CODE
A. Pre-1980 Alaska Homicide Statutes and the Courts'
Application of These Statutes to Motor Vehicle Deaths
Caused by Intoxicated Drivers
The legislative history of the new Alaska Criminal Code does not
refer to intoxicated drivers who kill. Consequently, it is inferrable that
the legislature tacitly approved of the courts' pre-1980 handling of
cases involving Intoxicated Motorists. The pre-1980 case law, there-
fore, may provide insight as to the legislature's intent regarding the
new Criminal Code's application to Intoxicated Motorists.
A murder conviction under the old Criminal Code required a
showing that the defendant "purposely and maliciously kill[ed] an-
14. The vast majority of states have vehicular homicide statutes. See infra note
140 and accompanying text. Alaska, however, has no vehicular homicide or vehicular
manslaughter statute. In Alaska, intoxicated drivers who cause fatal accidents are
prosecuted either under the .general homicide statutes, see ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.41.100-.130 (1983), or a reckless driving statute, see ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.040
(1984). Under the current Alaska law, therefore, an intoxicated driver who causes a
death could be convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder under the
Knowledge Provision, second degree murder under the Extreme Indifference Provi-
sion, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, or reckless driving.
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other,"15 and deaths caused by intoxicated drivers were usually treated
as manslaughter, 16 criminally negligent homicide,17 or reckless driv-
ing.18 Offenders convicted under these statutes were sentenced to
prison terms that were rarely as severe as Pears's ten-year sentence. 19
Under the old Code, courts did not consider homicides commit-
ted by intoxicated drivers to warrant murder convictions despite the
often egregious actions of the defendants. In Lupro v. State,20 for ex-
ample, the intoxicated defendant drove his van through severe rain
and wind at speeds much greater than the other traffic and made er-
ratic stops and starts. Although the power was out in much of the
city, the defendant was traveling with his lights off when his van
struck and killed a pedestrian.2' The defendant Lupro then left the
scene rather than staying to aid his victim. 22 Despite this outrageous
behavior, Lupro was convicted only of negligent homicide and failure
15. Former ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.030 (repealed 1980) provided:
Second degree murder. Except as provided in §§ 10 and 20 of this chapter,
a person who purposely and maliciously kills another is guilty of murder in
the second degree, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not
less than 15 years to life.
16. See, e.g., Godwin v. State, 554 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1976). The Alaska Criminal
Code defines manslaughter as follows:
Manslaughter. (a) A person commits the crime of manslaughter if the per-
son
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the death of another
person under circumstances not amounting to murder in the first or second
degree; or
(2) intentionally aids another person to commit suicide.
(b) Manslaughter is a Class A felony.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1979). The Alaska Criminal
Code defines criminally negligent homicide as follows:
Criminally negligent homicide. (a) A person commits the crime of crimi-
nally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, the person causes the
death of another person.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a Class C felony.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Huckaby v. State, 632 P.2d 975 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). The Alaska
Criminal Code defines reckless driving as follows:
Reckless driving. (a) A person who drives a motor vehicle in the state in a
manner which creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to a person
or to property is guilty of reckless driving. A substantial and unjustifiable
risk is a risk of such a nature and degree that the conscious disregard of it or
a failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.040 (1984).
19. See Pears, 672 P.2d at 911 n.4.
20. 603 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1979) (affirming Lupro's conviction for negligent homi-
cide and failure to render assistance to a person injured in an accident).




to render assistance to a person injured in an accident. The trial court
sentenced Lupro to 1000 hours of community service and a suspended
prison term.23
In Huckaby v. State,24 the defendant, with a blood alcohol level of
at least .17, drove at an excessive speed and lost control of his pickup
truck, causing the truck to veer off the road and overturn, killing three
passengers. 25 The appellate court noted that "Huckaby's driving was
about as reckless as it could have been for the entire time he drove" on
the occasion of the accident.26 Huckaby received one year in prison
for his reckless driving conviction. 27
In several Alaska cases decided before Pears involving deaths
caused by intoxicated drivers, the defendants had exhibited alcohol-
related problems before their accidents, and often had accumulated
prior driving while intoxicated ("DWI") convictions. 28 The courts
sentencing those defendants often mentioned the prior DWI offenses
23. See State v. Lupro, 630 P.2d 18, 19 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (state's appeal
from Lupro's successful motion for reduction of sentence). The appellate court disap-
proved of the sentence and stated that it believed Lupro should be sentenced to at least
one year in prison. Id. at 21 n.8. The court of appeals recognized that it did not have
the authority to increase Lupro's sentence, because only the state and not the defend-
ant had appealed the length of the sentence. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(10)
(1984). The court of appeals therefore reversed and remanded to the lower court for
resentencing.
24. 632 P.2d 975 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
25. Id. at 975-76. The blood alcohol level represents the percentage of alcohol by
weight in the blood. In Alaska, a person who has a blood alcohol level of.10 or higher
is guilty of driving while intoxicated [hereinafter "DWI"]. ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.030(a)(2) (1984).
26. 632 P.2d at 976.
27. Id. The court implied that it considered the one-year sentence severe but war-
ranted under the circumstances. See also Godwin, 554 P.2d at 455 (characterizing a
ten year manslaughter sentence with five years suspended as "certainly . . . severe"
for an intoxicated defendant who killed a motorcyclist while trying to pass a car on an
upward grade in a no passing zone).
28. See, eg., Rosendahl v. State, 591 P.2d 538, 539 (Alaska 1979); Sandvik v.
State, 564 P.2d 20, 25 (Alaska 1977); Godwin, 554 P.2d at 454; Layland v. State, 549
P.2d 1182, 1183-84 (Alaska 1976); Gullard v. State, 497 P.2d 93, 93-94 (Alaska 1972).
Alaska's DWI statute states in part:
(a) A person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated if the person
operates or drives a motor vehicle or operates an aircraft or a watercraft
(1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or any controlled sub-
stance listed in [ALASKA STAT. § ] 11.71.140 - 11.71.190;
(2) when, as determined by a chemical test taken within four hours after the
alleged offense was committed, there is 0.10 percent or more by weight of
alcohol in the person's blood or 100 milligrams or more of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, or when there is 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per 210
liters of the person's breath; or
(3) while the person is under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor
and another substance.
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (1984).
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as a relevant factor in setting the appropriate sentence. In Rosendahl
v. State, the defendant had two DWI convictions prior to his arrest
and a subsequent conviction for negligent homicide.29 The trial court
noted: "[When] someone goes about operating a motor vehicle over a
substantial period of time - by that the court means on numerous
occasions under the influence - they're going to get in substantial
trouble." °30 In Sandvick v. State,3 1 the court held a negligent homicide
sentence of twenty years with eight years suspended to be not clearly
mistaken "in light of Sandvick's long involvement with alcohol, his
extensive record of prior convictions for the offense of operating a mo-
tor vehicle while intoxicated, and the circumstances of the negligent
homicide." 32
The Alaska Supreme Court has also indicated that it will consider
subsequent DWI convictions in upholding sentences of drunk drivers.
In Gullard v. State,33 the court sustained an intoxicated driver's ten-
year manslaughter sentence, emphasizing that two violations of the
DWI statute had occurred after the accident that led to the man-
slaughter conviction. 34
Conversely, at least one Alaska court has considered the lack of
prior DWI offenses in sentencing a defendant whose drunk driving
caused the death of another. The Lupro court noted that one reason
for its light sentence was that Lupro had no prior DWI convictions.3 5
In sum, Alaska courts have shown an unwillingness to impose
harsh sentences on Intoxicated Motorists. In addition, in past deci-
sions the courts have heavily weighed defendants' previous, and even
subsequent, drunk driving convictions during sentencing. In contrast,
Pears received a ten-year sentence even though he had no prior DWI
29. 591 P.2d at 539. The Rosendahl court upheld a ten-year sentence for negli-
gent homicide against the intoxicated defendant. The defendant struck and killed a
thirty-year old mother of two children while she was walking on the sidewalk, and
failed to stop to aid his victim. In the three and one-half years prior to the incident,
the defendant had had five speeding convictions as well as his two DWI convictions.
30. Ard. at 540.
31. 564 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1979).
32. Id. at 25. The defendant had a twenty-year history of alcohol problems in-
cluding two convictions for public intoxication, six convictions for DWI, and two
additional pending charges of DWI at the time he hit and killed a fifteen-year old girl
who was riding her bicycle. Id. at 25.
33. 497 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1972).
34. Id. at 93-94. See also Layland, 549 P.2d at 1183-84, in which the court up-
held an eight-year sentence for manslaughter imposed upon an intoxicated driver who
killed one person and severely injured two others. The sentence was influenced by the
defendant's previous DWI conviction and his arrest subsequent to the fatal accident
for driving while intoxicated.
35. Lupro, 630 P.2d at 19, 20 n.6. The appellate court disapproved of the sen-
tence in Lupro, but the sentence it preferred was also not severe. See supra note 23.
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convictions.36 This disparity cannot be attributed to the changes in
the Criminal Code as of 1980. The cases referred to above continue to
apply to Alaska's current treatment of the Intoxicated Motorist even
though they precede the implementation of the Code. The Alaska leg-
islature must have known the position Alaska courts were taking to-
ward Intoxicated Motorists. Given the emotion surrounding the issue
of "drunk driving," it is unlikely the Alaska legislature would have
made such a radical change in the law regarding Intoxicated Motorists
without extensive debate. Yet the revised Criminal Code is silent in
regard to Intoxicated Motorists. This indicates that the Alaska legis-
lature likely did not want Intoxicated Motorists who cause the death
of another to be convicted of murder. Pears, therefore, represents a
substantial change in the judicial treatment of Intoxicated Motorists
- a change not supported by the legislative history of the Criminal
Code revision.
B. Legislative History of the New Criminal Code
The Alaska legislature did not state categorically that deaths
caused by Intoxicated Motorists can or cannot be punished as second
degree murder.37 Intoxicated Motorists cannot be prosecuted under
either section 11.41.110(a)(1), the Knowledge Provision,38 or section
11.41.1 10(a)(3), covering death in the course of enumerated crimes.39
The issue thus becomes whether the legislature intended for the Ex-
treme Indifference Provision, section 11.41.110(a)(2), to apply to In-
toxicated Motorists. The legislative history of the second degree
murder provision indicates that the legislature did not intend such kill-
ings to be prosecuted under the Extreme Indifference Provision.
An examination of the legislative history of Alaska's statute
reveals two examples of conduct that the legislature believed demon-
strated the extreme indifference to human life referred to in section
11.41.110(a)(2). The legislature stated that a person should be con-
victed of second degree murder if he caused a death either by shooting
through a tent under circumstances in which he did not know whether
a person was inside or by persuading the victim to play a game of
Russian roulette.4° Only the first of these examples supports the con-
36. Pears, 672 P.2d at 911.
37. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(l)-(a)(3) (1983) and discussion supra notes
5-13 and accompanying text.
38. The drivers could not be prosecuted under § 11.41.110(a)(1) because the "sub-
stantially certain" language involves "knowledge," which the Intoxicated Motorist -
as that term is used in this note - is presumed not to have. See supra note 11.
39. The motorist could not be convicted under § 11.41.110(a)(3) because driving
while intoxicated is a misdemeanor; this section is concerned only with persons who
have caused a death in furtherance of or in flight from a specified group of felonies.
40. 2 SENATE J. Supp. No. 47, at 10 (June 12, 1978).
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tention that Intoxicated Motorists should be convicted of murder. Ar-
guably, the act of shooting through a tent without regard for whether
a person is inside is analogous to driving while intoxicated through a
red light, unaware that another car is in the intersection. Each in-
volves an act that evidences recklessness, either to a person in the tent
or a person in the intersection. However, the magnitude of the risk is
greater, and the social utility less, in the case of shooting into a tent
than driving through a red light into an intersection, whether or not
the driver is intoxicated. These two factors - social utility and mag-
nitude of risk - are two of four factors set out by the Alaska Court of
Appeals in Neitzel v. State41 for use in determining whether conduct
should constitute murder, manslaughter, or reckless homicide under
the Criminal Code.42 Neitzel did not involve a situation in which the
defendant was unaware that someone might be shot. The court never-
theless stated that shooting at someone is itself "devoid of social util-
ity" whereas driving an automobile has some social utility even when
the driver is intoxicated.43 The Neitzel court further stated that the
magnitude of the risk created by an intoxicated person's driving is not
nearly as great as that created by one person shooting at another.44
While Neitzel does not negate the analogy between the legislature's
first example of extreme indifference and Intoxicated Motorists' con-
duct, it does suggest that Alaska courts view shooting a gun and driv-
ing while intoxicated to present risks of different magnitudes.
A comparison between an Intoxicated Motorist and the legisla-
ture's second example of extreme indifference, the person who per-
suades another to play Russian roulette, strongly supports the
argument that a drunk driver's actions do not fall within the second
degree murder statute. There is absolutely no utility in playing Rus-
sian roulette; the defendant knows that there is a one out of two
chance he will kill or severely injure the person he has persuaded to
play. The Intoxicated Motorist, on the other hand, cannot know that
his actions may create nearly that high a probability of causing
death.45
The Model Penal Code ("MPC") provides additional evidence of
the Alaska legislature's lack of intention to convict Intoxicated Motor-
ists of murder. The MPC, which serves as the foundation of the
Alaska Criminal Code,46 provides the following five examples of ac-
tions demonstrating such an extreme disregard for human life as to
41. 655 P.2d 325, 333 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
42. The other two factors are "the actor's knowledge of the risk" and "any pre-
cautions the actor takes to minimize the risk." Id. at 336-37.
43. Id. at 337.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 11.
46. See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 327.
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constitute murder: (1) causing the death of a person whom the de-
fendant persuaded to play Russian roulette; (2) causing the death of a
person whom the defendant claims he was trying to shoot over; (3)
killing someone by firing several shots into a home the defendant knew
to be occupied; (4) shooting into a moving automobile; (5) throwing a
heavy beer glass at a woman carrying a lighted oil lamp.47 The MPC's
five examples are drawn from actual cases, yet the MPC drafters did
not include any of the myriad of cases involving deaths caused by in-
toxicated drivers as an example of extreme indifference to human life.
Of the six as different examples of acts that constitute "extreme indif-
ference" 49 murder given by the Alaska legislature and the MPC com-
mentary, five involve shooting a gun and none involves a situation
where the instrument of death is an automobile. The only example
that did not involve a shooting - the example of a defendant who
threw a beer glass at a woman carrying a lighted lamp - borders on
intentional murder and certainly is an example of a situation in which
the defendant knows his action is likely to cause death or serious
injury.50
A comparison between the tentative draft of the Alaska murder
statute and the statute as actually enacted provides further support for
the view that the legislature did not intend to convict Intoxicated Mo-
torists under the second degree murder statute. The tentative draft
provided for a murder conviction when a person "recklessly causes the
death of another ...under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to the value of human life."' 51 By contrast, the final en-
acted version allows a murder conviction only for one who "intention-
ally performs an act that results in the death of another person under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of
human life."'52 By raising the required mental state from recklessness
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentaries Part II at 21-23 (1980) (foot-
notes omitted).
48. There are actually a total of seven examples given by the Alaska legislature
and the MPC commentary, but both of these sources list persuading another to play
Russian roulette as an example of "extreme indifference" murder.
49. "Extreme indifference" murder will be used to refer to an act that constitutes
murder because it causes the death of another, and because it indicates that the de-
fendant exhibited an extreme indifference toward human life.
50. The comparison of examples to infer legislative intent is a valid technique of
statutory construction. The Neitzel court noted that the common way to distinguish
between two related concepts was to give examples. 655 P.2d at 338 n.4. Signifi-
cantly, that court also noted that most of the examples given of conduct that exhibits
"extreme indifference to human life" were similar to Neitzel's conduct. Neitzel shot
at his girlfriend from close range several times, allegedly attempting to scare her, but
ultimately killing her.
51. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV. § 11.41.110 (Tent. Draft 1977).
52. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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to intention, the legislature indicated a general desire to circumscribe
rather than expand the category of actions that could be punished as
murder. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically construed a similar
change by the legislature of Utah to preclude a finding of second de-
gree murder against an intoxicated driver who unintentionally caused
a death.5 3
A further indication of the type of conduct that the Alaska legis-
lature intended to constitute extreme indifference to human life may
be derived from a comparison of the Extreme Indifference Provision,
section 11.41.110(a)(2), to section 11.41.110(a)(1). The legislature
stated that conduct which subsection 11.41.110(a)(2) would label as
"exhibiting extreme indifference to the value of human life" "is very
similar to the [conduct within the] 'substantially certain' clause in sub-
section (a)(l). ' 54 The example the legislature provides of an act that
falls within the confines of section 11.41.110(a)(1) is shooting into a
crowded room without a specific intent to cause death or serious phys-
ical injury.55 It is very hard to understand how one could believe that
driving a car while intoxicated through a red light is very similar to
shooting into a crowded room. In the former, death is unlikely to
occur;56 in the latter, it is a virtual certainty.
Several other Alaska statutes help to indicate the legislature's
view of the level of culpability of the drunk driver. The culpability of
intoxicated drivers who kill seems to fit more accurately within the
definitions of culpability in the assault statutes than in those of the
homicide statutes. Alaska Statute section 11.41.210(a)(3), as it existed
when the Criminal Code revision took effect, stated that "a person
commits the crime of assault in the second degree if. . . he recklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person by use of a dangerous
instrument. ' 57 The Criminal Code defines "reckless" conduct as
follows:
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or to a circum-
stance ... when he is aware of and consciously disregards a sub-
53. The Utah legislature removed the word "reckless" from its murder statute.
See State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Utah 1982). See infra text accompanying
notes 74-76 for a full discussion of this matter.
54. 2 SENATE J. Supp. No. 47, at 10 (June 12, 1978). Subsection 11.41.1 10(a)(1)
describes conduct that is substantially certain to cause death or physical injury:
(a) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if (1) with
intent to cause serious physical injury to another person or knowing that
the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical
injury to another person, the person causes the death of any person.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 11.
57. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.210(a)(3) (1980) (amended 1982). The 1982 amend-
ment to this statute moved section (a)(3) to section (a)(2), changed the word "he" to
"that person," and deleted the words "by means of a dangerous instrument."
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stantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situa-
tion; a person who is unaware of a risk of which the person would
have been aware had that person not been intoxicated acts reck-
lessly with respect to that risk.58
The legislative description of recklessness appears logically and
intuitively applicable to the act of driving while intoxicated. Driving
while intoxicated appears to constitute a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe. Moreover,
the legislature has clearly demonstrated its agreement with this char-
acterization of drunk drivers. The Senate Report on the 1978 revi-
sions indicates the legislature's intention to sweep DWI drivers who
cause serious injury within the assault provision:
Subsection (a)(3) covers the reckless causing of serious physical in-jury by means of a dangerous instrument. As an intoxicated person
acts recklessly ([Alaska Statute section] 11.81.900(a)(3)) and be-
cause an automobile can be a dangerous instrument ([Alaska Stat-
ute section] 11.81.900(b)(1 1)), it is expected that this subsection will
be used to prosecute drunk drivers who seriously injure their
victims. 59
Although the assault statute does not apply to cases in which a death
is caused, the legislative history of section 11.41.210(a)(3) reveals that
the legislature viewed the intoxicated driver's mental state as "reck-
lessness."60 It is thus unlikely that the legislature, absent a specific
statement to the contrary, intended to define the culpability standard
for drunk drivers differently when a death results. Alaska courts faced
with the task of determining which of the categories defined in the
general homicide statutes is appropriate for the conviction of Intoxi-
cated Motorists may, therefore, find their answer in the legislative his-
tory of section 11.41.210(a)(3).
III. STATUTORY LAW AND CASE LAW OF OTHER STATES
A comparison of Alaska law with that of other states suggests
that Alaska's legislature did not intend that the Intoxicated Motorist
who causes the death of another receive a murder conviction when it
enacted the Extreme Indifference Provision in 1980. First, the vast
majority of states do not convict such persons of murder. The Alaska
legislature did not explicitly indicate that death caused by Intoxicated
58. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(3) (1984). Nowhere in the murder statute does
the legislature use the term "recklessly." The manslaughter statute, however, does
cover those who "recklessly cause the death of another." See ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.120 (1984).




Motorists would constitute murder, and given the emotion that sur-
rounds the issue of drunk driving it is unlikely that the legislature im-
plicitly intended that Alaska join the minority. Second, the trend, if
such a trend exists, has been away from allowing murder convictions
for Intoxicated Motorists. Third, of the states with statutes very simi-
lar to Alaska's Extreme Indifference Provision, only one has ever used
such a provision to convict an Intoxicated Motorist. Fourth, a com-
parison of the Alaska murder provisions with the statutes in other
states that currently will convict the Intoxicated Motorist of murder
reveals some stark differences. Finally, in comparison with those
states that will convict such motorists, Alaska's treatment of DWI of-
fenders is among the most lenient, at least in terms of the length of
prison terms imposed upon DWI offenders. It is thus likely that the
legislature intended that Alaska also treat Intoxicated Motorists in a
manner less harsh than the severe position of the minority.
A. A Minority of States Have Convicted an Intoxicated Motorist
of Murder
The vast majority of states have never sustained a murder convic-
tion against an Intoxicated Motorist. Automobiles have been ubiqui-
tous for more than fifty years; it is thus not unreasonable to assume
that each state has brought to trial a defendant who caused the death
of one or more people under egregious circumstances while driving in
an impaired condition. Yet, in only ten states other than Alaska,
namely, Alabama, California, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, has
an Intoxicated Motorist received a murder conviction. 61 Further-
more, only thirteen states have homicide statutes that expressly pre-
clude a court from finding a defendant such as Pears guilty of
murder.62 Excluding Alaska, therefore, in thirty-six states, no statute
61. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. The Texas legislature repealed
the murder statute under which intoxicated drivers were convicted and enacted a new
murder statute that precludes the possibility of any such murder conviction in the
future. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974). Under the current mur-
der statute, a person can be convicted of murder only if he intentionally killed or
committed the act with knowledge that he would kill, or killed while committing one
of a specified group of felonies. Id.
62. These thirteen states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana,
Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Wyoming.
Either knowledge, purpose, intent, or an act in furtherance of a particular felony is a
prerequisite for a murder conviction in these states. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1502
to -1503 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-54(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-701 (1976); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (Bums 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:5-102 (West 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1985)(Montana uses the term "deliberate homicide"
instead of the word "murder"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-304 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
[Vol. 3:167
INTOXICATED MOTORISTS
expressly precludes courts from convicting an intoxicated driver of
murder and in only ten of these states has a court convicted an intoxi-
cated driver of second degree murder.
B. The Trend with Respect to DWI Murder Convictions
Pears is not part of a nationwide trend toward convicting intoxi-
cated drivers who unintentionally and unknowingly kill. In fact, in
the twenty years prior to Pears, not a single state had joined the mi-
nority of states that would convict an Intoxicated Motorist of murder.
Two state supreme courts have recently confronted for the first time
the issue of whether an Intoxicated Motorist could be convicted of
murder, and in both instances the courts reversed the murder convic-
tions. 63 In Essex v. Commonwealth,64 an intoxicated driver had passed
several cars in a no passing zone, swerved side to side for six miles,
and finally, while driving in the lane of oncoming traffic, hit another
car killing three people. The court held that the necessary elements
for murder could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt where the
defendant was an Intoxicated Motorist.65 The Virginia Supreme
Court suggested in Essex that it would draw the line and convict a
driver of murder if the person "deliberately drives a car into a crowd
of people at a high speed, not intending to kill or injure any particular
person, but rather seeking the perverse thrill of terrifying them and
causing them to scatter."'66
If there is any trend at all on the issue, it appears to be toward
fewer murder convictions for Intoxicated Motorists. Texas repealed
the statute under which it had previously convicted intoxicated drivers
of murder, and the state's current murder statute apparently precludes
a court from returning a murder conviction against an Intoxicated
Motorist.67 North Carolina has not convicted an Intoxicated Motorist
of murder since 192568 and Georgia has not convicted such a person
§ 2C:11-3 (West 1982); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (Page 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.115 (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974); WYO.
STAT. § 6-2-104 (1983).
63. State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Utah 1982). Essex v. Common-
wealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984). For a further discussion of Bindrup, see
infra text accompanying notes 74-76.
64. 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984). Virginia uses the common law definition
of murder. See VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (1982); see also infra note 91.
65. Id. at -, 322 S.E.2d at 222.
66. Id. at -, 322 S.E.2d at 220.
67. See supra note 57.
68. The last North Carolina decision upholding an Intoxicated Motorist's murder




since 1966.69 Additionally, the last Kentucky case in which an intoxi-
cated driver was convicted of murder was decided in 1968, and that
case has never been followed.70
C. Other States' Interpretations of Extreme Indifference
or Similar Provisions
Evaluating the homicide statutes of the other forty-nine states
makes more apparent the impropriety of convicting an Intoxicated
Motorist of murder under Alaska's criminal statutes. Among the
thirty-six states whose homicide statutes do not expressly preclude a
murder conviction for an intoxicated driver, ten states have enacted
provisions essentially identical to Alaska's second degree murder stat-
ute.71 Only one of these ten states - Oklahoma - has ever convicted
an Intoxicated Motorist of murder under the part of its murder statute
that is similar to Alaska's Extreme Indifference Provision, and in the
last forty years, Oklahoma courts have convicted no one under that
provision. 72
69. The last such conviction in Georgia was in Woods v. State, 222 Ga. 321, 149
S.E.2d 674 (1966).
70. See Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1977).
71. These ten states are Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. Only North Dakota
has a statute that uses the precise phrase that the Alaska statute uses, "extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life," to define one type of murder. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-.01 (Supp. 1983). In the other nine states actions that either show a
depraved mind regardless of human life or actions that show a depraved indifference
to human life are murder. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1984); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 201(B) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 (West
1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Cupa. Supp. 1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1
(1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.8 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-16-7 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.02 (West 1982). The Alaska legislature has given no indication that these stan-
dards are any different than the "extreme indifference to human life" standard em-
ployed by the Alaska legislature. In fact, the Alaska Court of Appeals in Neitzel v.
State, 655 P.2d 325, 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), noted that Alaska's extreme indiffer-
ence standard reflects the common law requirement that the conduct evidenced a "de-
praved heart regardless of human life." There is no reason to believe that depraved
heart and depraved mind have different meanings.
It may be argued that Kentucky's murder statute is also substantially similar to
the statutes of the ten states cited above, but there is one crucial difference. The Ken-
tucky statute explicitly states that a person can be convicted of second degree murder
for an unintentional automobile homicide. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
(Baldwin 1984).
72. See Ware v. State, 47 Okla. Crim. 434, 288 P. 374 (1930). The defendant was
convicted under the part of the statute that requires that the defendant's conduct show
a depraved mind regardless of human life. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 705 (West
1983).
Intoxicated drivers in Oklahoma who have unintentionally and unknowingly
killed have been convicted of murder within the last forty years under the felony mur-
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The states that have murder statutes similar to Alaska's have had
ample opportunities to convict an Intoxicated Motorist of murder. In
a South Dakota case, for example, an intoxicated driver drove down
side streets at night at well over the speed limit, forcing a pickup truck
off the road. In an ensuing police chase, the driver turned his car
lights off, hit a police car, and ran through a red light. Finally, the
defendant struck another car, killing that car's driver. The defendant
was charged with manslaughter. 7
3
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the notion that an intoxicated
driver - who had driven through three red lights and admitted that
he was aware of the risk occasioned by his conduct - was guilty of
second degree murder.74 That court reversed the second degree mur-
der conviction because of the Utah legislature's amendments to Utah's
second degree murder statute. Utah originally allowed a court to con-
vict a defendant of second degree murder if the defendant, while "act-
ing under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life. . . recklessly engaged in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of
death to another and thereby cause[d] the death of another. . ...75
The court held that the legislature's deletion of the word "recklessly"
removed the reckless DWI defendant from the ambit of the murder
statute.76 The Alaska legislature made an alteration similar to the one
undertaken in Utah between the tentative draft of the revised Criminal
Code and the version of the new Code that was enacted. Still, the
Alaska courts have not noted the ,change.77
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Montgomery v. State
78
upheld a murder conviction against an intoxicated driver where the
defendant did not have a premeditated design to kill, more recent Wis-
der section of the Oklahoma homicide statutes. This method of bringing drunk driv-
ers within the reach of the murder statutes is logically distinct from holding that a
drunk driver possessed the requisite mental state for a murder conviction. See infra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
73. State v. Seidschlaw, 304 N.W.2d 102, 103-04 (S.D. 1981). In Howard v.
State, 346 So.2d 918, 919-20 (Miss. 1977), the defendant was driving 90 to 95 miles
per hour and was highly intoxicated when he caused the fatal accident. Once again
the charge was manslaughter.
74. State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
75. Id. at 675-76 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1953) (amended 1979)).
76. The court stated that the amendment to the murder statute "makes it clear
that reckless conduct is not sufficient to prove the offense of murder in the second
degree." Id. at 676.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
78. 178 Wis. 461, 190 N.W. 105 (1922). In Montgomery, an intoxicated driver
was convicted of the second degree murder of three people whom he struck while they
were standing in the street. As Montgomery had knowledge that he was about to
strike the pedestrians, he cannot be an Intoxicated Motorist within the meaning this




consin cases suggest that a murder conviction can be sustained only
where the defendant was practically certain that death would result
from his actions. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
a murder conviction in Wagner v. State, 7 9 where an intoxicated driver
drove down the main street of a town at 11:00 p.m., striking and kill-
ing a pedestrian. The court strongly suggested that it would find the
state of mind necessary to support a murder conviction only if it was
apparent that the driver saw or should have seen the people he hit.80
Distinguishing Wagner from the earlier Montgomery case, which con-
victed an intoxicated driver of second degree murder, the court stated:
In Montgomery . . . the defendant turned into the lane of travel
where the victims were standing. He did so despite the fact that
other occupants of his vehicle saw the victims and warned him that
he would thereby kill people in the street. Although the defendant
had been warned of the existence of the victims in the street, pre-
sumably in time to avoid them, he continued on in their direction
ultimately striking them down. . . . In the instant case, neither
the defendant, nor the occupants of his vehicle, saw the victim in
the road prior to striking him. . . . [T]here was no testimony that
the defendant was forewarned .of the victim's presence in the
street.81
D. Comparison of Alaska to States That Have Convicted
Intoxicated Drivers of Murder
Of the ten states, other than Alaska, that have convicted Intoxi-
cated Motorists of murder, eight may still convict such motorists.8 2
The second degree murder statutes in each of these states, however,
differ significantly from Alaska's provision. This suggests that the
Alaska legislature could not have intended Alaska's second degree
79. 76 Wis.2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977). State v. Cooper, 117 Wis.2d 30, 344
N.W.2d 194 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), where the defendant, who drove through a red
light at 50 miles per hour while intoxicated and killed the driver of a car crossing the
intersection from the other direction, was not even charged with murder, provides
further evidence of Wisconsin's movement away from Intoxicated Motorist murder
convictions.
80. Wagner, 76 Wis.2d at 44, 250 N.W.2d at 339.
81. Id. at 43-44, 250 N.W.2d at 339 (citations omitted).
82. See supra text accompanying note 61. Texas has repealed the statute under
which it convicted intoxicated drivers of murder, and the current Texas homicide
statutes preclude a murder conviction for an Intoxicated Motorist. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974). Similarly, North Carolina last convicted an In-
toxicated Motorist in 1925, Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925), and the state's
recent enactment of a new vehicular homicide statute appears to preclude the possibil-
ity of any such murder conviction in the future. Under North Carolina's new vehicu-
lar homicide statute a person commits "felony death by vehicle if he unintentionally
causes the death of another person while engaged in the offense of impaired driving."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.4 (1984).
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murder statute to produce the same result as the statutes in these eight
states.
Two of the states, Kentucky and Tennessee, clearly indicate in
their homicide statutes that a drunk driver can be convicted of mur-
der.83 The Alaska legislature, in contrast, did not expressly state in its
homicide statutes that an Intoxicated Motorist can receive a murder
conviction.
Oklahoma's homicide statutes provide notice to the public, albeit
in a slightly less direct fashion than the statutes of Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, that an intoxicated driver who unintentionally and unknow-
ingly kills may under certain circumstances receive a murder
conviction. In Oklahoma, any death caused during the perpetration of
a felony constitutes murder, 84 and a second DWI conviction is a fel-
ony.85 An intoxicated driver, therefore, who unintentionally causes
the death of another and who has a previous DWI conviction may be
convicted of murder.86 Alaska does not have such a sweeping felony
murder statute;8 7 moreover, a DWI conviction in Alaska is not a fel-
ony regardless of the number of prior convictions. 8 A DWI convic-
tion, therefore, can never trigger the operation of Alaska's felony
murder statute.
Alabama has a statute allowing murder convictions based on
reckless conduct that shows a depraved mind. 9 The standard in Ala-
bama is similar to that included in the tentative draft of Alaska's mur-
der statute, but Alaska rejected that standard when it enacted its new
Criminal Code.90
California, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, the four
other states that have in the past and might still convict an Intoxicated
Motorist of murder, use the common law definition of murder.91
83. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-211, 39-2-231 (1982).
84. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.8 (West 1983).
85. Id. tit. 47, § 11-902(c) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
86. See, e.g., Isom v. State, 646 P.2d 1288 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
87. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.1 10(a)(3) (1983) (The only crimes for which the felony
murder statute will be invoked in Alaska are arson in the first degree, kidnapping,
sexual assault in the first or second degree, and robbery in any degree.).
88. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(b) (1984).
89. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(2) (1982).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
91. Under the common law, murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. This malice aforethought can be express or implied.
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW § 1, at 34 (2d ed. 1969). See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-
189 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 2502(c) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). In two
of these four states, Pennsylvania and Georgia, it appears that an intoxicated driver
will be convicted of murder only in the most extreme cases. In Commonwealth v.
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Alaska has, however, expressly rejected the common law definition of
murder.92
A comparison of Alaska's DWI statute with those of other states
offers another indication that the Alaska legislature did not intend for
Intoxicated Motorists to receive murder convictions. In several other
states, either the second93 or third94 DWI conviction is a felony. In
Alaska, to the contrary, DWI remains a misdemeanor regardless of
the number of prior convictions.95 Furthermore, among the states
that will convict an intoxicated driver of murder, Alaska has the
shortest period of incarceration for repeat DWI offenders. 96 The
Alaska DWI statute provides for a minimum sentence of only twenty
days in jail for someone with one prior DWI conviction, and a mini-
mum punishment of thirty days in prison for someone with two or
more prior DWI convictions. 97 In comparison, Tennessee has a 45-
day minimum sentence for the second offense and a 120-day minimum
for the third offense,98 and South Carolina has a 3-year minimum for
the third offense and a five-year minimum for the fifth offense. 99 In
light of the Alaska legislature's lenient treatment of DWI offenders,
Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 337 A.2d 545 (1975), the defendant was convicted of murder, but
he had been speeding in an area where children generally play, had killed a boy who
was riding on a bicycle, and then had failed to stop after the accident. Foster v. State,
239 Ga. 302, 236 S.E.2d 644 (1977), involved a person who was under the influence of
liquor and drugs and was driving at 90 miles per hour across the center line when he
collided with another car, killing the other driver. The court held that an intoxicated
driver could conceivably be convicted of murder but that the reckless disregard for the
safety of others that this defendant showed should not serve as the implied malice
aforethought necessary for a murder conviction. Id. at 302, 236 S.E.2d at 645-46.
92. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV. § 11.41.110 (Tent. Draft 1977).
93. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 11-902(c) (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1984-85);
TEx. TRAF. REG. CODE ANN. § 6701e-1 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983).
94. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.3792(l)(c) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2940
(Law. Co-op. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-4
(1984); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
95. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(b) (1984).
96. Until 1980, California's penalties for repeat offenders were more lenient than
Alaska's penalties, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102(a) (West 1971) (repealed 1980), but
now the California minimum sentence for repeat DWI offenders is much longer than
that of Alaska. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 23165 (West Cum. Supp. 1985) (90-day
minimum for second offense) with ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(b) (1984). Four years
after the Criminal Code revision, the Alaska legislature added some harsh penalties
not involving incarceration for repeat DWI offenders. These involve revoking defend-
ants' licenses for long periods of time. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.181(c) (1984).
Nevertheless, a legislature's willingness to impose harsh non-jail penalties on DWI
offenders does not prove that it is willing to impose severe jail sentences on Intoxicated
Motorists.
97. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(c) (1984).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-403(a)(1) (Supp. 1984).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2940(3), (5) (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1984).
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therefore, it is unlikely that the legislature wanted Alaska to join the
minority of states that convict Intoxicated Motorists of murder.
E. Summary
The foregoing comparison of the relevant homicide statutes and
case law in other states with those of Alaska provides strong evidence
that the Pears court misinterpreted the legislature's intent in enacting
the new Criminal Code when the court upheld Pears's murder convic-
tion. Most states have never sustained a murder conviction for an In-
toxicated Motorist. Those few states that have convicted an
intoxicated driver of murder either have murder statutes that ex-
pressly provide such a penalty for an Intoxicated Motorist or they
have homicide statutes that not only differ from the Alaska murder
statutes, but contain language similar to language the Alaska legisla-
ture considered and then rejected. 100 Of those states with murder stat-
utes that strongly resemble the Alaska murder statutes, only
Oklahoma has ever convicted an Intoxicated Motorist of murder, and
the last murder conviction under the relevant Oklahoma statutory
provision occurred more than forty years ago. There is no trend to-
ward greater use of second degree murder statutes to punish intoxi-
cated drivers. In fact, there may be the beginnings of a trend in the
opposite direction.
According to the Alaska legislature, the culpability underlying
DWI offenses does not warrant a felony conviction - not even in the
case of persistent offenders. Unlike the legislatures of several other
states, the Alaska legislature gave no indication that deaths caused by
Intoxicated Motorists would constitute murder. Furthermore,
Alaska's murder statutes, as illuminated by their legislative history, do
not support such a reading. In light of all these factors, the Alaska
Court of Appeals should have concluded that the legislature did not
intend a second degree murder conviction for Pears or any other In-
toxicated Motorist.
IV. THE PEARS CASE
A. The Facts
On October 5, 1981, an intoxicated driver, Richard Pears, ran a
red light and crashed into a car that was in the intersection, killing the
driver and one passenger of the other car and severely injuring another
passenger.101 Pears's own passenger, whom he dropped off before the
accident, had told him that his driving scared her. As Pears walked to
his truck, two policemen had warned him that he should not drive.
100. See supra notes 51, 52, 90, 92, and accompanying text.
101. Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903, 909-10 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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Pears, ignoring the warning, drove through several stop signs and traf-
fic signals before the fatal collision. Nineteen-year old Pears had no
previous criminal record, nor had he been convicted of alcohol-related
driving offenses. A jury nevertheless convicted him of second degree
murder and a judge sentenced him to twenty years in prison.1 02 The
Alaska Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld Pears's convic-
tion.10 3 The Alaska Supreme Court found Pears's sentence excessive
and remanded for resentencing. 1°4
B. Problems with the Pears Court's Reasoning
The court of appeals in Pears rejected the defendant's argument
that the legislature did not intend that motor vehicle homicides caused
by intoxicated drivers would be treated as murders, 10° noting that the
"legislature has not indicated that no motor vehicle homicide could be
charged as second degree murder."' 06 The court ignored the fact that
the same logic can also cut in the opposite direction: neither has the
legislature indicated that a murder charge would be appropriate in
cases such as Pears. The latter interpretation of a legislature's silence
is preferred by many other states. Among the thirty-five states that
currently have murder statutes that neither clearly preclude nor ex-
pressly permit a murder conviction of an Intoxicated Motorist, 10 7 only
seven states other than Alaska have ever convicted an intoxicated
driver of murder. 08 In the last twenty years, no state except Alaska
has convicted an intoxicated driver of murder when considering the
issue as a matter of first impression.
The Pears court implied that its verdict was in accord with the
102. Id. at 905. See supra note 29.
103. 672 P.2d at 905.
104. Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985). See supra note 2.
105. Id. at 906.
106. Id. The legislature intended that some motor vehicle homicide defendants
could be charged with murder - such as where the defendant intended to cause the
death of the other person, or where the defendant knowingly caused the death of a
person. These situations are not relevant to Pears or this note and it must be assumed
that the court meant that the legislature did not intend to preclude all deaths uninten-
tionally and unknowingly caused by an intoxicated driver from constituting second
degree murder.
107. The number 35 is derived from the sum of 13 (the number of states that have
statutes expressly precluding a murder conviction for an Intoxicated Motorist), see
supra note 61, and two (the number of states whose statutes expressly provide for such
a murder conviction), see supra note 82 and accompanying text, subtracted from 50
(the total number of states).
108. Ten states other than Alaska have convicted an Intoxicated Motorist of mur-
der. See supra text accompanying note 61. Two of those states, however, Kentucky
and Tennessee, have statutes that expressly provide for such a conviction, see supra
note 83 and accompanying text, and one state, Texas, currently has a murder statute
that expressly precludes such a conviction, see supra note 61.
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case law in most states: "It has been generally recognized that the
mere fact that a motor vehicle has been the instrumentality of death
does not preclude a murder charge where the evidence also discloses
the requisite elements of murder."10 9 Interpreted literally, the above
statement is, of course, correct. Every state would convict a defendant
for murder who intentionally killed another in cold blood, where the
murder weapon was an automobile. The statement, however, is irrele-
vant to the issue in the Pears case. The relevant issue was not whether
an automobile can be a murder weapon, but rather whether an Intoxi-
cated Motorist could be convicted of murder under the Extreme Indif-
ference Provision.
Given the cases it cited following the above quotation, 110 how-
ever, the court of appeals apparently believed that states "generally
recognize" that the use of an automobile - as opposed to a gun or a
knife - as the instrument of death does not allow an Intoxicated Mo-
torist to escape a murder conviction. If this was in fact the court's
belief, the court simply was incorrect. At most, nine other states could
be said to "recognize" the possibility that an Intoxicated Motorist
could be convicted of murder; a minimum of forty states do not "gen-
erally recognize" such a principle.111
The cases cited by the Pears court do not add much strength to its
position, as only four of the seven states whose cases the court cited
would have convicted Pears of murder.1 12 Moreover, the murder stat-
utes in two of those four states specifically state that an unintentional
automobile killing can be murder.11 3 In the three other states whose
cases the court cited, Pears almost certainly would not have been con-
victed of murder. Two of these states, New York and Oregon, have
never convicted an Intoxicated Motorist of murder;' 14 the other state,
109. 672 P.2d at 911 n.5.
110. Id. Several of the citations given are of cases from states that have permitted
murder convictions of intoxicated drivers who unintentionally and unknowingly kill.
111. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
112. The four states that might have convicted Pears of murder are Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. They constitute approximately half of the states
that appear likely to allow murder convictions of intoxicated drivers who unintention-
ally and unknowingly kill. The cases cited from these states were: Commander v.
State, 374 So. 2d 910 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637
P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539
(Ky. 1977); Farr v. State, 591 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979).
113. The states are Kentucky and Tennessee. See supra note 91.
114. The court cited People v. France, 57 A.D.2d 432, 394 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977), and State v. Boone, 294 Or. 630, 661 P.2d 917 (1983). In France, the
court held that the defendant could not be convicted of murder where he killed a
person while he was attempting to elude the police by speeding through town and
ignoring several traffic signals. 57 A.D.2d at 433, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 892. In Boone, the
intoxicated driver did not cause the death of anyone and was convicted of second
degree assault. 294 Or. at 630, 661 P.2d at 917.
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Wisconsin, has convicted an intoxicated driver of murder only where
the defendant clearly saw his victim in time to stop and thus had
knowledge that he was going to kill if he did not act to prevent it. 11
C. The Pears Court's Misplaced Reliance on Neitzel v. State
The Pears court relied on the Alaska Court of Appeals' decision
in Neitzel v. State 11 6 to support its opinion, but Neitzel does more to
strengthen Pears's argument than it does to help the government's
case.1 17 In Neitzel, the defendant was convicted of second degree mur-
der under the Extreme Indifference Provision of the Alaska murder
statutes. s18 Neitzel, who was intoxicated at the time, purposely fired a
number of shots at his girlfriend, who was sitting on the ground, ap-
parently in an attempt to frighten her. 119 Several of the shots struck
the ground within an inch of the victim before the fatal shot hit her in
the head.1 20 The Neitzel court gave a strong indication of its views on
the proper treatment of automobile homicide cases involving intoxi-
cated drivers:
To determine whether a defendant is guilty [of murder or man-
slaughter] the jury must consider the nature and gravity of the risk,
including the harm to be foreseen and the likelihood that it will
occur .... [T]he significant distinction [between murder and
manslaughter] is in the likelihood that a death will result from the
defendant's act. Where the defendant's act has limited social utility,
a very slight though significant and avoidable risk of death may
make him guilty of manslaughter if his act causes death. Driving an
automobile has some social utility although substantially reduced
when the driver is intoxicated. The odds that a legally intoxicated
person driving home after the bars close will hit and kill or seriously
injure someone may be as low as one chance in a thousand and still
qualify for manslaughter. Where murder is charged, however, an
act must create a much greater risk that death or serious physical
injury will result.121
The Neitzel court also gave examples of conduct constituting ex-
treme indifference to human life. These examples consisted of shoot-
ing into a home, room, train, or automobile, where others are known
115. The court also cited Wagner v. State, 76 Wis.2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977).
For a discussion of Wagner, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
116. 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
117. Neitzel does provide some support for the Pears court's opinion in that the
Neitzel court stated that the difference between manslaughter and second degree mur-
der was one of degree and was a question for the jury. Id. at 335-38.
118. Id. at 326.
119. Id.
120. Id
121. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
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to be or might be, with complete disregard of the consequences. 122
These examples actually support Pears's argument that his conduct
did not rise to the level of extreme indifference to human life. Pears's
actions exhibited greater utility and less risk than the acts in any of the
examples.
D. The Pears Court Provides No Guidance for Future Decisions
The definitional language used by the Alaska legislature creates a
substantial difference between the crime of murder and the crime of
manslaughter. Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of twenty
years 123 whereas a person convicted of second degree murder can re-
ceive a sentence of up to ninety-nine years in prison.124 With the ex-
ception of felony murder, the legislature defines a person as a
murderer only if that person caused a death while intending to kill, or
with knowledge that his conduct was substantially certain to cause
death, or under circumstances in which his conduct showed an ex-
treme indifference to human life. 125 The only Alaska case prior to
Pears in which the actor's conduct was held to have constituted ex-
treme indifference to human life under section 11.41.110(a)(2) was
Neitzel. 126 Thus, before Pears, there seemed to be a clear distinction
between murder and manslaughter - a murderer (1) killed in the
course of committing one of six felonies, 127 (2) killed intentionally,1 28
(3) killed knowing that his conduct was substantially certain to cause
death,129 or (4) killed while committing an act of no utility that was
likely to cause a death and that generally involved the use of a gun.130
The Pears court has now blurred the distinction between manslaughter
and murder not only where intoxicated drivers are involved but for
122. Id. at 327. The court took the examples it cited from R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW § 1, at 36 (2d ed. 1969).
123. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1983); id. § 12.55.125 (1984). Even though Pears
received a ten-year sentence, and the maximum penalty for manslaughter in Alaska is
twenty years, there are several significant reasons for determining whether Intoxicated
Motorists can receive a murder conviction in Alaska. First, in Page v. State, 657 P.2d
850 (Alask Ct. App. 1983), the court of appeals analyzed sentences for second degree
murder imposed under the old Criminal Code and noted that "the typical sentence is
twenty to twenty five years." Id. at 855. As this "typical" sentence exceeds the maxi-
mum possible manslaughter sentence, it is fair to infer that second degree murder
sentences will generally involve longer prison terms than manslaughter sentences.
Second, there is undoubtedly a greater stigma to be borne by a defendant who receives
a murder conviction rather than a manslaughter conviction.
124. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125.
125. Id. § 11.41.100-.110 (1983).
126. 655 P.2d at 325.
127. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3).
128. Id. § 11.41.100.
129. Id. § 11.41.110(a)(1).
130. See supra notes 40-50, 116-22 and accompanying text.
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homicide cases in general. The Pears court's expansion of the murder
statute opens the door for other Alaska courts to extend the reach of
the murder statute by further expanding the concept of extreme indif-
ference murder. Through such action the Alaska courts could eviscer-
ate the Alaska manslaughter statute - a statute that the Alaska
courts can only apply after it has been determined that all of the mur-
der statutes are inapplicable.13' As a result of this evisceration, de-
fendants in Alaska could be stigmatized as murderers and given
sentences of up to ninety-nine years for conduct intended by the legis-
lature to constitute manslaughter and not murder. A court is not the
proper body to alter the murder/manslaughter distinction; any refor-
mation of the distinction should require a mandate from the
legislature. 132
E. The Difference in Culpability Between Pears
and a Murderer in Alaska
When one compares Pears's conduct to conduct defined by the
Alaska legislature and courts to be extreme indifference murder -
persuading another to play Russian roulette, or shooting into a tent,133
home, room, automobile, or train, oblivious of the consequences, 34 or
firing several shots directly at a girlfriend intending to frighten her,135
- it becomes clear that Pears's conduct does not rise to the level of
extreme indifference to human life. None of the examples given by the
Alaska legislature or by the Alaska courts prior to Pears is similar to
the conduct of an Intoxicated Motorist. 136 Pears's conduct simply did
not exhibit the same degree of culpability as the conduct listed in the
131. The manslaughter statute provides in relevant part:
A person commits the crime of manslaughter if the person . . . intention-
ally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the death of another person under cir-
cumstances not amounting to murder in the first or second degree ....
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
132. The Alaska Supreme Court's review of Pears's sentence, Pears v. State, 698
P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985), further contibutes to the blurring of the distinction between
murder and manslaughter. In deciding whether Pears's sentence was excessive, the
court declined to compare his sentence with prior second degree murder sentences,
electing instead to look to prior manslaughter sentences for guidance. Id. at 1202-03.
133. These are the examples the Alaska legislature gave of extreme indifference to
human life. See supra text accompanying note 40.
134. These are the examples of extreme indifference to human life provided in Per-
kins's treatise on criminal law, see supra note 122, as cited in Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 327.
135. 655 P.2d at 326-27 (facts from which the Neitzel court held the convicted
defendants to have demonstrated extreme indifference to human life).
136. The only other examples of conduct that constitutes extreme indifference to
human life were given by the Alaska legislature in the Senate Journal. These were
some of the examples the Neitzel court had taken from the Model Penal Code. All of
these examples are distinguishable from Pears's conduct. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 46-50, 122.
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examples given by the legislature and by the Neitzel court. Perkins, in
his treatise on criminal law, clearly noted the difference:
[A] motorist who attempts to pass another car on a "blind curve"
may be acting with such criminal negligence that if he causes the
death of another in a resulting traffic accident he will be guilty of
manslaughter. And such a motorist may be creating fully as great a
human hazard as one who shoots into a house or train "just for
kicks," who is guilty of murder if loss of life results. The difference
is that in the act of the shooter there is an element of viciousness -
an extreme indifference to the value of human life - that is not
found in the act of the motorist. 137
Pears's conduct resembles the conduct of passing someone on a
blind curve in several ways. Both involve: (1) driving, (2) violating a
driving law, (3) driving in an area in which a car coming from another
direction would have the right of way, (4) lack of knowledge of
whether a car is in one's path, and (5) unintentionally and unknow-
ingly killing. 138 Pears's conduct is certainly more similar to passing on
a blind curve than to shooting into a house "just for kicks," a highly
sadistic act that involves the use of a gun and has absolutely no social
utility.
Drunk driving is a controversial and emotional subject. Many
people, and probably some jurors, will view the trial of a drunk driver
who kills as pitting the innocent, sober, deceased victim against the
culpable, intoxicated, living defendant. The jurors may wish to con-
vict the driver of the harshest penalty the law allows. In Pears, this
desire may especially have been present because the driver was a
nineteen-year old man with no wife or child, whereas the victims were
the wife and daughter of a corrections officer 139 and the daughter's
young friend. The court must not allow the murder conviction of a
person whose actions did not constitute extreme indifference to human
life. In failing to instruct the jury that it could not find Pears guilty of
murder, the court in Pears allowed such a conviction.
137. R. PERKINS, supra note 122 at 37. Other states have impliedly recognized this
difference in culpability as evidenced by the fact that thirty-nine states have never
convicted an intoxicated driver of murder if the driver unintentionally and unknow-
ingly killed his victim.
138. Three features distinguish Pears's conduct from that of one who passes on a
blind curve: Pears was warned not to drive, Pears was intoxicated at the time he was
driving, and Pears apparently went through several red lights. Nevertheless, Pears's
intoxication at the time of the accident should not elevate his conduct to the level of
extreme indifference to human life. As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in
Blackwell v. State, 34 Md. App. 547, 554, 369 A.2d 153, 158 (1977), "While there
may be depraved persons who persistently drink, it does not follow that those who
drink are implicitly depraved."
139. Brief for Appellant at 16, Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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V. A LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE: VEHICULAR
HOMICIDE STATUTES
The Alaska trial court and court of appeals in Pears should not be
criticized too harshly for misinterpreting the legislature's intent on the
issue of whether Intoxicated Motorists could be convicted of second
degree murder. The legislature failed to give the courts a clear indica-
tion of the appropriate punishment for Intoxicated Motorists. Alaska
remains one of only seven states making no express statutory provision
for deaths caused by automobile drivers. 140
The provisions of vehicular homicide statutes in the forty-three
states that have such laws are not uniform.14 1 Several states' vehicular
homicide statutes, for example, require a showing of reckless disregard
for the safety of others in order to sustain a vehicular homicide
charge; 142 other statutes condition conviction upon proof of criminal
negligence; 143 other states apply their vehicular homicide statutes
upon proof of either gross negligence or the defendant's intoxica-
tion;144 and still other states have statutes that are invoked whenever
the defendant who caused a death was operating a motor vehicle un-
lawfully. 145 Still, each of these forty-three legislatures has guided the
courts of its state in determining the appropriate treatment of automo-
bile deaths in general and the punishments for those responsible for
such deaths. A legislature's enactment of a vehicular homicide statute
generally provides a clear indication of that legislature's view concern-
ing murder convictions for intoxicated drivers. 146 Alaska's legislature
should take the opportunity to make its own clear policy statement on
the appropriateness of a murder conviction for a drunk driver who
kills.
140. The other six states are Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Vir-
ginia. See supra note 61.
141. The states also do not place vehicular homicide statutes in the same position
in regulatory codes. Twenty-seven of th states include their vehicular homicide stat-
utes in their criminal codes, while the other sixteen states place automobile death
statutes in the motor vehicle section of their code.
142. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
143. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.024.1(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1985).
144. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21.2(1), (2) (West Cum. Supp. 1985).
145. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101.A (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984).
146. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for instance, has held that the legislature's
enactment of the state's vehicular homicide statute precluded a finding of murder
against an Intoxicated Motorist. Blackwell v. State, 34 Md. App. 547, 555, 369 A.2d
153, 158-59 (1977). In Blackwell, the court, quoting State v. Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236,
246, 242 A.2d 575, 581 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1964), noted:
[t]he Legislature in enacting Section 388 [the manslaughter by automobile
statute] to punish persons who cause the death of another "as the result of
the driving, operation or control of an automobile ... in a grossly negligent




The Alaska legislature should enact two vehicular homicide stat-
utes. The first statute, which could be captioned "vehicular homicide
in the first degree," would cover persons who cause a death while driv-
ing recklessly, or while intoxicated. 147 The offense would be catego-
rized as a Class A felony, and thus the defendant could receive a
maximum sentence of twenty years in prison, but if the defendant had
no prior felony convictions he most likely would receive a five-year
sentence.148 The other vehicular homicide statute, which could be
captioned "vehicular homicide in the second degree," would cover
persons who could not be guilty of vehicular homicide in the first de-
gree, but who nonetheless caused a death while operating a motor ve-
hicle in a negligent manner. This offense would be considered a Class
C felony and it would carry with it a maximum sentence of five years,
but with the likelihood that a first-time felon would receive a prison
sentence of one year or less.149
The legislative history of the proposed acts should clearly instruct
courts to invoke one of these two statutes whenever a motorist, whose
actions do not fall within the coverage of either the first degree murder
statute or the Knowledge Provision of the second degree murder stat-
ute, causes a death while operating a vehicle unlawfully. The legisla-
tive history should clearly indicate that courts should invoke the
second degree murder statute only in the case of an automobile driver
who actually sees his victims or otherwise knows or should know that
he is substantially certain to kill or to cause serious physical injury.
Furthermore, the legislative history should make it clear that courts
should not invoke the reckless driving statute 50 when an intoxicated
driver is responsible for the death of another.
Enactment of the vehicular homicide statutes would yield several
important improvements. First, the new statutes would provide the
Alaska courts with needed guidance concerning the legislature's inten-
tions on the issue of automobile homicide. The Alaska courts would
no longer be saddled with the difficult, case-by-case task of catego-
rizing vehicular homicides as reckless operation,' 5 ' negligent homi-
cide, 152 manslaughter, 153 or second degree murder. 154 Instead, once
147. Thus, it would cover those people who caused a death while driving in viola-
tion of either ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.040 (1984) (reckless driving), or ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.030 (1984) (operating a vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while intoxicated).
148. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c) (1984). Five years is the presumptive term
of imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a Class A felony.
149. Id. § 12.55.125(e).
150. Id. § 28.35.040.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 11.41.130 (1983).
153. Id. § 11.41.120.
154. Id. § 11.41.110.
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the state showed that a defendant acted unlawfully, but that he did not
intentionally kill or kill with knowledge that death or serious injury
was substantially certain to result, he would be guilty of vehicular
homicide. The issue of whether the defendant was guilty of first or
second degree vehicular homicide would turn on whether or not the
defendant was either driving recklessly or driving while impaired by
alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident. Once offenders were so
categorized, the court would be in a position to compare each individ-
ual defendant's conduct with that of others in the same category to
determine the proper sentence, producing consistent sentences among
defendants with similar degrees of culpability.155
Second, the vehicular homicide statutes would also provide the
public with more useful notice of the law regarding intoxicated drivers
and automobile homicides. At present, most people probably have lit-
tle idea whether a particular automobile homicide would constitute
reckless driving, negligent homicide, manslaughter, or murder. The
vehicular homicide statutes would greatly simplify public understand-
ing and jury instructions. The public would have to learn only that a
driver who kills someone while driving unlawfully has committed ve-
hicular homicide either in the first degree or the second degree, de-
pending on whether the driver was intoxicated, using drugs, or driving
recklessly.
Third, the enactment of such statutes would announce to the pub-
lic that the legislature considers homicide by vehicle to be a serious
offense, worthy of separate attention in the Criminal Code. Moreover,
by clearly delineating the definition and punishment of motor vehicle
deaths caused by intoxicated, reckless, or negligent drivers, the legisla-
ture would further demonstrate the state's strong condemnation of
reckless and intoxicated driving.
Finally, the proposed statutes and the accompanying legislative
history should preclude a court from allowing a jury to convict an
intoxicated driver of murder unless the court believes that the reason-
able juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the intoxi-
cated driver intended to kill or that the driver knew or should have
known that he was substantially certain to cause serious physical in-
jury or death. Thus, in a particularly tragic case such as Pears, the
jury will not have the opportunity to convict an individual of murder
- a conviction unsupported by either the intent of the legislature in
Alaska or the law in the vast majority of states.
In addition to enacting the vehicular homicide provision pro-
posed above, the legislature should also increase the punishment for
155. When making its sentencing determination the court would consider factors
such as prior DWI or reckless driving convictions, the egregious nature of the defend-
ant's conduct, and the actions of the defendant after the accident.
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repeat DWI offenders. The current statute provides a minimum sen-
tence of twenty days for the second DWI offense, increasing to thirty
days for the third and subsequent offenses. 156 Many states have
greater minimum sentences for repeat DWI offenders than does
Alaska. Amending the DWI statute to increase the minimum
sentences to forty-five days for a second conviction and to one hun-
dred and twenty days for a third or subsequent conviction, in conjunc-
tion with the enactment of the vehicular homicide statutes, would
express a strong state commitment to punish intoxicated motorists
harshly while obviating the need for Alaska courts to resort to an ex-
tremely strained construction of the state's murder statutes in order to
deal with the problem of Intoxicated Motorists.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the revised Criminal Code in Alaska,
Intoxicated Motorists could not have been convicted of murder; they
were charged instead with either reckless driving, negligent homicide,
or, at most, manslaughter. Under the new Criminal Code, the applica-
bility of the second degree murder statute to an intoxicated driver who
unintentionally and unknowingly kills is unclear. However, when the
legislative history of the second degree murder statute is examined and
compared with other Alaska statutes that give guidance in this area
and with similar murder statutes of other states, it becomes clear that
the legislature did not intend the courts to allow a jury to hand down a
murder conviction for an Intoxicated Motorist. Unfortunately for
Richard Pears, the court in his case concluded otherwise. The Pears
court, noting that the legislature did not expressly declare that Pears's
actions could not constitute murder, allowed a jury to convict Pears of
second degree murder. Pears ultimately received a ten-year prison
sentence despite the fact that he had no previous criminal record or
prior alcohol-related traffic offenses.
To prevent harsh sentences like the one given in Pears and to
clarify the legislature's intent in this area, two vehicular homicide stat-
utes should be enacted - one to cover conduct like Pears's and an-
other to cover cases involving deaths caused by negligent or unlawful
conduct while operating a vehicle. The legislature should also increase
the penalty for repeat DWI offenders. These actions would provide
the courts with guidance as to how the legislature wants them to
handle automobile homicide cases and will also strongly condemn
drunk driving by making its consequences extremely severe.
Alan Fishel
156. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(c) (1984).
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